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Diffusion	in	Referendum	Campaigns:		
The	Case	of	EU	Constitutional	Referendums	
	
The	problem	of	cross-case	influences	is	crucial	in	the	analysis	of	social	phenomena.	Is	a	referendum	held	
in	a	state	entirely	a	‘domestic’	event?	No	work	has	applied	diffusion	theories	to	the	study	of	referendum	
campaigns.	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 show	diffusion	 effects	 among	 the	 2005	Constitutional	 Treaty	 referendums.	
Spain,	 France,	 the	Netherlands,	 and	 Luxembourg	 used	 the	 referendum	method	 to	 ratify	 the	 European	
Constitution.	 Based	 on	 85	 interviews	 with	 campaigners	 in	 all	 four	 countries,	 I	 find	 that	 campaign	
arguments	and	 strategies	were	not	always	homegrown.	However,	 such	diffusion	 is	not	automatic	and	
depends	on	diffusion	channels.		
	
In	 2005,	 four	 European	Union	 (EU)	member	 states	 held	 referendums	on	whether	 to	 ratify	 the	 Treaty	
establishing	a	Constitution	for	Europe	(TCE),	in	chronological	order:	Spain,	France,	the	Netherlands,	and	
Luxembourg.	While	 these	 referendums	were	 seemingly	distinct	 from	one	another,	 identical	 campaign	
posters	 and	 arguments	were	 circulated	 across	 Europe.	 Diffusion	 is	 a	 process	 wherein	 new	 ideas	 and	
models	 of	 behavior	 spread	 geographically	 from	 a	 core	 site	 to	 other	 sites	 (Bunce	 et	 al.,	 2006).	While	
referendum	 campaigns	 have	 been	 studied	 thoroughly,	 such	 cross-case	 influences	 remain	 overlooked	
(e.g.	 Glencross	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Qvortrup,	 2006).	 I	 show	 that	 campaign	 arguments	 were	 not	 always	
homegrown	 in	 the	 2005	 EU	 referendums.	 Campaigners	 could	 learn	 from	 the	 experience	 of	 previous	
campaigns.	This	was	important	because	strategic	arguments	blamed	the	treaty	for	controversial	 issues	
such	as	degradation	of	welfare	state	or	loss	of	national	identity.	Diffusion	across	cases	was	thus	crucial	
in	bringing	new	arguments	into	the	debate.	All	campaigns	were	not	created	equal,	and	the	cases	were	
not	independent.	
The	extant	literature	has	not	applied	diffusion	theories	to	the	study	of	referendum	campaigns.	
Instead	of	using	diffusion	processes	as	an	 independent	variable	and	trying	 to	 trace	 their	effect	on	the	
referendum	 results	 quantitatively	 (e.g.	 Collingwood	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 I	 treat	 diffusion	 as	 the	 dependent	
variable	 and	 detail	 social	 mechanisms	 that	 connect	 referendum	 campaigns	 through	 interview	 data.	
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What	are	 the	 factors	 that	 facilitate	 such	diffusion?	 In	 line	with	 the	expectations	of	 the	policy	 transfer	
and	 modular	 action	 literatures,	 I	 find	 that	 diffusion	 depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 channels	 such	 as	
collaborative	 networks,	 shared	 language	 and	 common	 media.	 Furthermore,	 based	 on	 85	 in-depth	
interviews	 with	 campaigners	 all	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum	 in	 all	 four	 countries,	 I	 show	 that	
collaborative	networks	lead	to	‘shallow’	diffusion	between	campaigners.	But	where	these	networks	are	
coupled	with	shared	language	and	media	sources,	diffusion	becomes	‘deep’,	operating	among	voters	as	
well	as	campaigners.		
Below,	 I	 first	 review	the	 literature	on	 referendums	 to	highlight	 the	 importance	of	 referendum	
campaigns	 in	 shaping	 public	 opinion,	 which	 makes	 borrowing	 campaign	 arguments	 all	 the	 more	
important.	Next,	I	bring	together	the	policy	transfer	and	modular	action	literatures	and	discuss	the	paths	
through	 which	 diffusion	 travels.	 Third,	 using	 extensive	 interview	 data,	 I	 demonstrate	 how	 diffusion	
effects	conditioned	campaign	dynamics	in	the	2005	EU	constitutional	referendums.				
	
Existing	Literature:	Do	Referendum	Campaigns	Matter?	
The	 voting	 behavior	 literature	 suggests	 that,	 in	 most	 instances,	 referendum	 campaigns	 are	 more	
influential	than	election	campaigns	(e.g.	de	Vreese,	2007).	When	parties	line	up	in	a	non-traditional	way,	
or	the	issue	is	unfamiliar	to	the	mass	public,	referendum	campaigns	can	be	decisive	(LeDuc,	2002).	This	
is	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	 referendums	 on	 international	 treaties,	 as	 voters	 do	 not	 have	 well-formed	
opinions.	The	way	an	issue	is	presented	can	produce	dramatic	differences	in	public	opinion	(e.g.	Chong	
et	al.,	2007).	
Students	of	EU	referendums	have	recently	turned	their	attention	to	referendum	campaigns.	This	
literature	is	divided	between	‘second-order’	and	‘issue-voting’	interpretations,	attributing	the	results	to	
domestic	or	European	factors	(Reif	et	al.,	1980;	Siune	et	al.,	1994).	Recent	research	looks	into	campaigns	
closely	 to	understand	 the	 circumstances	under	which	 voters	 rely	on	EU	attitudes	 rather	 than	 second-
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order	effects	and	vice	versa	(e.g.	Garry	et	al.,	2005).	 In	the	most	comprehensive	comparative	study	so	
far,	Hobolt	 (2009)	 finds	 that	 the	 information	 provided	 to	 voters	during	 the	 campaigns	matters.	When	
the	negative	consequences	of	a	No-vote/Yes-vote	are	stressed,	more	people	favor/oppose	the	proposal.	
Similarly,	De	Vreese	and	Semetko	(2004)	show	that	 in	the	Danish	referendum	on	the	Euro	the	No	side	
broadened	the	issue	to	enlargement,	social	welfare	and	national	sovereignty,	identifying	this	as	the	key	
winning	strategy	for	the	No	campaign.	
In	the	case	of	the	2005	referendums,	the	European	Constitution	was	a	technical	document,	and	
a	great	majority	of	the	public	was	unfamiliar	with	its	content.	Polls	show	that	public	opinion	in	all	four	
countries	 favored	 the	 TCE	 several	 months	 before	 the	 votes.1	 Yet	 the	 final	 referendum	 results	 varied	
remarkably,	 which	 suggests	 that	 the	 campaigns	 were	 important	 in	 shaping	 public	 opinion.	 Political	
actors	presented	the	TCE	to	their	publics	strategically	by	linking	it	to	unpopular	themes	such	as	loss	of	
sovereignty	or	even	Turkish	membership	in	the	EU.	Diffusion	facilitated	the	transfer	of	such	arguments	
from	one	campaign	to	the	other.	
Diffusion	 among	 referendum	 campaigns	 is	 therefore	 an	 important	 but	 neglected	 area	 of	
research.	Closa	(2007)	shows	that	the	governments	were	influenced	by	one	another	in	their	decisions	to	
call	 the	 TCE	 referendums	 in	 2005.	 Jahn	 and	 Storsved	 (1995),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 look	 into	 cross-case	
influences	among	the	1994	EU	membership	referendums	in	Austria,	Finland,	Sweden,	and	Norway.	They	
argue	that	there	was	a	domino	strategy,	where	the	most	pro-EU	countries	(Austria	and	Finland)	started	
the	referendum	vote,	followed	by	the	two	unsure	cases	(Sweden	and	Norway).	But	the	strategy	failed	in	
Norway.	 The	 authors	 suggest	 that	 Norway	 rejected	 the	 treaty	mainly	 because	 the	 Norwegian	 Centre	
Party	 was	 able	 to	 organize	 the	 anti-EU	 movement,	 connecting	 agrarian	 interests	 with	 national	
																																								 																				
1	For	polls,	see:		
http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/-Archivos/Marginales/2560_2579/2577/Es2577.pdf;	
http://www.csa.eu/dataset/data2004/opi20040915c.htm;	
(Eurobarometer,	2004);	
http://www.tns-ilres.com/cms/Home/Nos-secteurs/Politique---Opinion.	
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independence.	Moreover	in	a	survey,	only	56%	of	the	Finns	showed	awareness	of	the	positive	results	in	
Austria,	 whereas	 the	 Nordic	 countries	 were	 much	 more	 interested	 in	 each	 other’s	 decisions.	 These	
findings	 not	 only	 point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 interconnectedness	 among	 Nordic	 countries,	 but	 also	
provide	 evidence	 for	 the	 significance	 of	 campaigns	 in	 shaping	 public	 opinion.	 Yet	 the	 specific	
mechanisms	of	cross-case	influences	remain	overlooked.		
	
Applying	Diffusion	Theories	to	Referendum	Campaigns	
Diffusion	 involves	a	 transmitter,	an	adopter,	an	 innovation	 that	 is	being	diffused,	and	a	channel	 along	
which	 the	 item	may	 be	 transmitted	 (Soule,	 2003).	My	 focus	 is	 the	 channels	 that	 transmit	 campaign-
related	 information	 between	 campaigners	 in	 different	 countries.	Diffusion	 studies	 focus	 on	 two	main	
fields	–	policy	transfer	and	modular	phenomena.		
	
Policy	transfer	
The	first	venue	brings	together	studies	on	policy	transfer	and	policy	diffusion,	looking	into	the	temporal	
and	spatial	clusters	of	policy	reform	(e.g.	Dolowitz	et	al.,	2000;	Elkins	et	al.,	2005;	Kopstein	et	al.,	2000;	
Rose,	1991).	Here,	the	focus	is	essentially	on	‘lesson-drawing’,	a	process	by	which	actors	borrow	policies	
developed	in	one	setting	to	develop	policies	within	another.		
The	policy	transfer	literature	shows	that	political	entities	that	are	geographically	proximate	and	
thus	share	political	networks	and	economic,	social	and	cultural	 linkages	borrow	more	from	each	other	
(e.g.	 Ovodenko	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Stone,	 2004;	 Weyland,	 2005).	 Similarly,	 the	 mass	 media	 coverage	 is	
important	 in	exchanging	 information	 from	one	government	 to	another	 (Braun,	2011;	Dolowitz,	1997).	
For	 instance,	 Linos	 (2011)	 shows	 that	 governments	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 imitate	 countries	 that	 are	
geographically,	 linguistically,	 and	 culturally	 proximate	 and	 thereby	 disproportionately	 covered	 in	 the	
news.		
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While	campaign	strategies	 is	not	a	conventional	focus	for	this	 literature,	Dolowitz	et	al.	 (1999)	
study	why	the	Labour	Party	in	the	United	Kingdom	borrowed	electoral	strategies	from	the	Democrats	in	
the	United	States.	The	authors	emphasize	 the	 importance	of	 the	common	 language	between	 the	 two	
states,	 the	 shared	 ideology	 among	 the	 parties,	 the	 personal	 relationships	 between	 the	 leaders,	 and	
finally	 the	 role	 of	 policy	 entrepreneurs.	 Similarly,	 Needham	 (2010)	 explores	 the	 cases	 where	 specific	
aspects	of	one	campaign	such	as	polling	or	voter	targeting	has	been	borrowed	by	another.	She	finds	that	
such	transfers	were	among	ideologically	similar	states	and	facilitated	by	leaders,	staff	and	consultants.	
	
Modular	action	
As	 a	 second	 venue	 to	 study	 diffusion,	 the	 modular	 action	 literature	 focuses	 on	 action	 that	 is	 based	
significantly	on	the	prior	successful	example	of	others	(Beissinger,	2007).	Four	democratic	revolutions	–	
the	Bulldozer,	Rose,	Orange,	and	Tulip	Revolutions	–	which	took	place	in	Eastern	Europe	between	2000	
and	2006	are	studied	as	examples	of	modular	political	phenomena	(Beissinger,	2007;	Bunce	et	al.,	2006).		
This	 literature	 identifies	 three	 main	 channels.	 First,	 collaborative	 networks	 crossing	 national	
boundaries	promote	diffusion	(e.g.	Bunce	et	al.,	2006;	Tarrow,	2005).	These	networks	can	be	provided	
by	NGOs,	 civil	 society	 activists	 or	 other	more	established	 institutional	 frameworks.	Alternatively,	 they	
could	be	based	on	interpersonal	relations.	Studying	contention	in	the	UK	and	France	between	1730	and	
1848,	Rudé	 (1964)	 found	that	 information	about	rebellions	diffused	through	communication	networks	
of	travelers	along	transportation	routes.	Hedström	et	al.	(2000)	showed	similarly	that	between	1894	and	
1911	the	diffusion	of	the	Swedish	Social	Democratic	Party	was	an	unintended	by-product	of	the	political	
agitators’	 traveling.	 Second,	 studies	 show	 that	 a	 sense	of	 interconnectedness	 across	 cases	 –	 resulting	
from	common	institutional	characteristics,	histories,	cultural	affinities	and	languages	–	allows	agents	to	
make	analogies	across	cases	and	read	relevance	into	developments	in	other	contexts	(Beissinger,	2007;	
Tarrow,	2005).	Another	channel	of	diffusion	is	the	media.	Studies	on	race	riots	repeatedly	found	that	the	
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media	 served	 as	 a	 channel	 of	 diffusion	 by	 creating	 a	 cultural	 linkage	 between	 African	 Americans	 in	
different	metropolitan	areas	(Myers,	2000;	Soule,	2003;	Spilerman,	1976).	Tarrow	(2005)	suggests	that	
such	channels	 lead	 to	a	common	 ‘theorization’	across	boundaries,	where	a	matter	 is	defined	within	a	
cause-effect	 relationship.	 Today	 there	 is	 an	 emerging	 literature	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 social	 media	 on	
collective	action,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	Arab	Spring	(Aday	et	al.,	2012;	Pierskalla	et	al.,	2013).		
Importantly,	these	channels	parallel	the	findings	of	the	policy	transfer	literature.	Both	literatures	
emphasize	the	political,	economic,	social	and	cultural	linkages,	the	similarities	between	the	sending	and	
receiving	units	(including	linguistic	or	ideological	closeness),	and	mass	media	coverage	in	enabling	such	
transfers.	 Yet,	 neither	 applied	 these	 arguments	 to	 referendum	 campaigns.	 Below	 are	 the	 three	
hypotheses	drawn	from	these	studies:	
H1:	The	more	collaborative	networks	the	campaigners	from	different	states	share,	the	more	their	
campaigns	will	be	influenced	by	one	another.	
H2:	The	more	linguistic	and	cultural	similarities	the	states	have,	the	more	their	campaigns	will	be	
influenced	by	one	another.	
H3:	The	more	media	channels	the	states	share,	the	more	their	campaigns	will	be	 influenced	by	
one	another.	
As	 such,	 diffusion	 is	 the	 cooperation	 among	 campaigners	 in	 different	 countries	 and	 the	
subsequent	 adoption	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 elaborated	 elsewhere.	 The	 channels,	 in	 turn,	 are	 what	
determine	 the	 existence	 and	 level	 of	 such	 diffusion.	 Operationalizing	 the	 dependent	 variable	 and	
demonstrating	that	borrowing	occurred	is	difficult	as	similar	strategies	may	emerge	in	different	settings	
without	 clear	 lines	 of	 causality	 (Needham,	 2010,	 p.	 610).	 James	 and	 Lodge	 (2003)	 criticize	 the	 policy	
transfer	 approach	 for	 not	 sufficiently	 distinguishing	 borrowing	 from	 rational	 policymaking,	 rendering	
finding	 evidence	 for	 such	 transfers	 problematic.	 In	 the	 literature,	 cross-national	 policy	 transfer	 is	
evidenced	through	three	steps;	policy-makers	searching	for	a	policy,	visiting	a	lender	country	to	examine	
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the	policy,	and	the	essential	features	of	the	policy	to	be	present	in	the	borrower	country	(Dolowitz	et	al.,	
1999;	 Needham,	 2010).	 In	 this	 research,	 physical	 contacts	 such	 as	 participation	 in	 each	 other’s	
campaigns	 or	 in	 joint	 political	 events;	 discussions	 among	 the	 campaigners	 on	 campaign	 themes	 for	
instance	 through	 specific	 conferences	 on	 the	 treaty;	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 and	
strategies	in	borrower	campaigns	visible	in	identical	 leaflets	or	 in	the	campaign	preparation	processes,	
were	studied	closely	as	possible	indicators	of	such	transfers.		
	
Data	
In	2005,	some	other	EU	member	states	also	intended	to	hold	a	referendum	to	ratify	the	treaty,	however	
they	decided	not	to	do	so	after	the	French	and	Dutch	rejections.	I	limit	the	analysis	to	the	four	countries	
that	actually	held	referendums	because	the	campaign	preparations	in	the	other	countries	did	not	have	
the	 same	 urgency	 and	 thereby	 were	 not	 comparable.	 I	 conducted	 the	 field	 research	 between	 April-
December	2008	and	interviewed	campaigners	from	all	political	parties	and	civil	society	groups	that	were	
active	 in	 the	 campaign.	 These	 interviews	 were	 in	 English,	 French	 or	 Spanish,	 face-to-face,	 semi-
structured,	 and	 based	 on	 both	 opportunity	 and	 snowball	 sampling.	 I	 interviewed	 85	 campaigners:	 19	
from	 Spain,	 23	 from	 France,	 22	 from	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 21	 from	 Luxembourg.	 Overall,	 32	 of	 the	
interviewees	were	campaigners	from	civil	society,	53	from	political	parties;	40	were	No	campaigners,	45	
were	 Yes	 campaigners.	 The	 questionnaire	 used	 and	 a	 full	 list	 of	 the	 organizations	 interviewed	 are	
presented	at	the	end	of	this	article.	
	
Diffusion	in	2005	TCE	Referendums	
In	 2005,	 campaigners	 in	 the	 four	 countries	 that	 held	 referendums	 on	 the	 TCE	 discussed	 campaign	
themes	 and	 borrowed	 arguments	 from	 one	 another.	 73	 out	 of	 85	 mentioned	 that	 they	 met	 with	
campaigners	 from	 the	 other	 countries:	 18	 in	 Spain,	 17	 in	 France,	 19	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 19	 in	
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Luxembourg.	51	out	of	85	said	that	their	campaign	was	affected	by	the	other	campaigns:	11	in	Spain,	4	
in	 France,	 15	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 21	 in	 Luxembourg.	 These	 figures	 provide	 direct	 evidence	 for	 the	
existence	of	diffusion.2	The	left-wing	No	campaigners	were	the	most	connected	actors	across	Europe	in	
this	particular	debate.		
Yet,	such	diffusion	was	not	automatic	and	depended	on	channels.	Table	1	presents	the	findings	
of	this	research,	showing	that	all	three	hypotheses	have	empirical	support.		
	 Table	1	 	
The	number	of	interviewees	that	mentioned	interactions	through	collaborative	networks	is	considerably	
higher	as	this	channel	is	shared	by	all	four	states.	In	contrast,	it	is	primarily	French	and	Luxembourgish	
interviewees	that	brought	up	the	transfers	through	the	last	two	channels.	This	is	not	surprising	because	
Luxembourg	 speaks	 French,	 consumes	 French	 media	 channels	 and	 receives	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	
commuters	 from	France	 every	 day.	 Thus,	 the	 interaction	between	 France,	 Spain	 and	 the	Netherlands	
was	not	as	strong	as	that	between	France	and	Luxembourg.	This	interaction	was	so	dense	that	the	main	
Luxembourgish	No	campaigner,	the	left-wing	No	Committee,	took	its	lead	from	the	French	No	campaign.		
Detailed	 interview	data	shows	 that	collaborative	networks	 lead	 to	 ‘shallow’	diffusion	between	
campaigners,	 by	 connecting	 them	 and	 enabling	 them	 to	 discuss	 campaign	 themes.	 The	 addition	 of	 a	
shared	language	and	common	media	channels,	however,	generates	‘deep’	diffusion	among	campaigners	
and	 voters,	 by	 increasing	 the	 presence	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 in	 borrower	 states.	 Furthermore,	 this	
research	 finds	 that	 diffusion	 was	 not	 sequential.	 Because	 the	 debate	 in	 France	 started	 very	 early,	
themes	 of	 the	 French	 debate	 could	 be	 traced	 even	 in	 Spanish	 campaigners’	 arguments,	 whose	
referendum	preceded	France's.		Figure	1	summarizes	the	connections	between	campaigns.	
Figure	1	
																																								 																				
2	 For	 further	 empirical	 evidence	 showing	 that	 French	 arguments	 appeared	 in	 the	 Luxembourgish	 campaign	 see	
(Dumont	et	al.,	2007).	
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Below,	 I	 address	 the	 indicators	 of	 diffusion	 –	 physical	 contacts,	 discussions	 among	 the	
campaigners	on	campaign	themes,	and	presence	of	campaign	arguments	in	borrower	campaigns	–	in	the	
discussion	of	each	channel.	
Collaborative	Networks	
This	 channel,	 composed	 of	 institutional	 and	 personal	 connections,	 leads	 to	 physical	 contacts	 and	
discussion	of	campaign	themes	among	campaigners.	Nevertheless,	the	extent	to	which	arguments	were	
borrowed	varies	across	cases.	The	existence	of	a	shared	language	deepens	such	interactions	and	leads	
to	a	greater	degree	of	adoption	in	the	borrower	states.	
A.	Institutional	networks	
Institutional	 networks	 were	 common	 to	 all	 four	 cases,	 and	 were	 mentioned	 in	 the	 interviews	 as	
important	 facilitators.	 These	 were	 namely	 the	 European	 Parliament	 (EP)	 groups,	 the	 European	 anti-
globalization	 network,	 and	 other	 ad	 hoc	 European	 networks.	 First,	 both	 the	 Yes	 and	No	 campaigners	
pointed	to	 the	EP	groups	and	parties	as	platforms	to	share	 ideas	with	other	similar	European	political	
parties.	This	formed	a	regular	meeting	opportunity,	where	most	of	the	campaigners	said	they	discussed	
campaign	 themes.	 Although	 these	 networks	 constituted	 a	 platform	 for	 political	 parties,	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 they	 were	 influential	 in	 shaping	 the	 campaigns	 is	 not	 uniform	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum.	
Interestingly,	 the	 far-left	 and	 far-right	 took	 extreme	 positions.	 The	 far-left	 mentioned	 close	 contacts	
with	other	far-left	parties	in	Europe,	whereas	far-right	parties	rejected	any	links	to	other	such	parties.		
To	 take	 an	 example,	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 both	 the	 Yes	 and	 No	 campaigners	 (16	 out	 of	 22)	
mentioned	the	EP	groups	as	platforms	where	they	discussed	their	experiences.	International	Secretary	
of	 the	Dutch	Labor	Party	 (PvdA)	Marije	Laffeber	said:	 ‘We	exchanged	a	 lot	of	experience,	we	had	two	
really	experienced	parties	who	dealt	with	these	issues	before,	from	Ireland	and	Denmark.	They	tried	to	
convince	us	not	to	have	a	referendum	...	because	it	always	works	against	the	social	democratic	parties.’3	
																																								 																				
3	Interview,	22	October	2008.	
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The	 Dutch	 far-left	 Socialist	 Party	 (SP)	 mentioned	 contacts	 with	 The	 Left	 in	 Luxembourg	 and	 but	
particularly	close	contacts	with	the	French	Communist	Party	in	setting	the	agenda.	In	striking	contrast,	
the	Dutch	far-right	parties	refused	any	such	links.	In	Leader	of	Livable	Rotterdam	Marco	Pastors’	words:	
‘There	 is	suspicion	of	 racism.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	align	yourself	with	other	countries’	movements,	 they	are	
extreme	right’.4		
Institutional	 linkages	 were	 more	 visible	 and	 prominent	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 left-wing	 civil	
society	 groups.	 The	 strong	 anti-globalization	 network	 in	 Europe	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	 these	
groups	 to	 come	 together,	 analyze	 the	 new	 developments,	 and	 form	 positions.	 The	 left-wing	 activists	
frequently	referred	to	the	Association	for	the	Taxation	of	Financial	Transactions	for	the	Aid	of	Citizens	
(ATTAC)	network,	and	the	European	Social	Forum	(ESF)	as	important	platforms.	The	ESF	meetings	bring	
together	 the	 left-wing	 social	 movements	 with	 political	 parties.	 Particularly,	 the	 activists	 stressed	 the	
2003	ESF	meeting	in	Paris	and	the	2004	ESF	meeting	in	London	as	sources,	where	the	TCE	was	debated	
intensely.	However,	they	also	highlighted	the	ad	hoc	nature	of	these	informal	networks.	Susan	George	
from	the	leadership	of	ATTAC	France	said:	‘These	relations	are	messy	and	based	on	ad	hoc	connections,	
dependent	on	who	knows	whom’.5		There	was	no	structure	apart	from	the	ATTAC	network,	the	annual	
ESF	 meetings,	 and	 the	 temporary	 European	 No	 Campaign	 (ENC)	 network	 established	 by	 British	
businessmen	at	 the	 time.6	 The	 ENC	was	 a	 Europe-wide,	 independent,	 cross-party	 network	of	 political	
parties	 and	NGOs	which	 brought	 together	 both	 right	 and	 left-wing	No	 campaigners.	 It	was	 set	 up	 to	
coordinate	 ‘anti-EU	Constitution’	activities,	and	maximize	 the	No	vote	 in	every	EU	 referendum	on	 the	
TCE.		
Importantly,	 the	 anti-globalization	 network	 circulated	 the	 French	 analysis	 of	 the	 TCE,	 not	 the	
Spanish	 one,	 across	 Europe.	 The	 Spanish,	 Dutch	 and	 Luxembourgish	 left-wing	 activists	 stated	 that	 in	
																																								 																				
4	Interview,	8	April	2008.	
5	Interview,	13	September	2008.	
6	Interview	with	Thomas	Rupp,	director	of	the	‘European	No	Campaign’,	18	April	2008.		
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preparation	 for	 the	campaign	they	 first	 read	about	 the	discussion	 in	France,	and	were	 inspired	by	 the	
French	 debate	 in	 their	 argumentation.	 Through	 this	 institutional	 channel,	 campaigners	 borrowed	
campaign	arguments.		
In	 Spain,	 left-wing	No	 campaigners	mentioned	 strong	 links	 to	 the	 European	 anti-globalization	
network.7	They	explained	that	the	ATTAC	France	was	especially	a	reference	point	as	they	had	developed	
theoretical	questions	and	arguments	regarding	the	TCE	as	early	as	2003.	Specifically,	the	book	by	Yves	
Salesse,	a	key	 left-wing	campaigner	 in	France,	was	mentioned	as	a	resource.	This	book	was	translated	
and	published	in	Spanish.	These	remarks	demonstrate	that	diffusion	was	not	necessarily	sequential.	The	
French	No	campaign	debate	started	early	despite	the	fact	that	their	campaign	was	held	 later	than	the	
Spanish	one.		
The	 French	 civil	 society	 campaigners	 confirmed	 that	 the	 ATTAC	 France	 provided	 the	 first	 and	
main	 left-wing	 analysis	 of	 the	 TCE.	 At	 the	 2004	 ESF	 meeting,	 French	 campaigners	 distributed	 their	
analysis	and	the	‘Appeal	of	200’,	signed	by	200	representatives	of	left-wing	groups,	to	all	other	European	
left-wing	 political	 and	 social	 forces.8	 Their	 motivation	 was	 to	 show	 that	 it	 was	 not	 only	 a	 French	
resistance.	Susan	George	of	ATTAC	France	said:	‘We	wanted	to	show	that	this	was	not	a	Franco-French	
affair,	that	we	were	not	alone,	and	that	a	lot	of	people	in	Europe	shared	our	views’.9	As	Francine	Bavay	
of	The	Greens,	put	it:	‘We	tried	to	alert	all	European	ecologists.	We	wanted	to	show	that	we	were	not	
nationalists’.10	
In	 the	 Netherlands,	 Willem	 Bos,	 president	 of	 the	 left-wing	 ConstitutionNo,	 said	 that	 in	
preparation	for	the	campaign,	they	first	read	on	the	topic	and	that	they	knew	the	discussion	in	France	as	
																																								 																				
7	 Interviews	with	Carlos	Girbau	Costa	on	8	October	2008,	Marc	Giménez	Villahoz	on	15	October	2008,	and	Jaime	
Pastor	on	8	October	2008.		
8	Interview	with	Maxime	Combes,	8	September	2008.	
9	Interview,	13	September	2008.	
10	Interview,	22	September	2008.	
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they	were	reading	their	work.11	Erik	Wesselius,	member	of	 the	ConstitutionNo,	specifically	 referred	to	
the	ESF	in	Paris	in	2003,	which	discussed	the	TCE	in	detail.12	He	added:	‘The	whole	debate	in	France	was	
really	 very	 important	 for	 the	 other	 countries’.	 He	 stressed	 the	 legitimization	 impact	 of	 the	 French	
debate	for	the	Netherlands,	as	it	lent	credence	to	their	arguments	and	contributed	to	their	visibility.		
In	 all	 cases,	 the	 French	 left-wing	 theoretical	 analysis	 of	 the	 TCE	was	 a	 crucial	 source.	 But	 for	
Luxembourg,	diffusion	was	deeper	due	to	the	special	cultural	and	linguistic	connection	between	the	two	
countries.	 Luxembourg’s	main	No	campaigner,	 the	 left-wing	No	Committee,	openly	acknowledged	the	
support	it	received	from	the	French	left-wing	No	campaign.	They	mentioned	the	difficulty	of	organizing	
the	 campaign	 without	 such	 support,	 as	 Luxembourg	 has	 a	 very	 small	 community.	 André	 Kremer,	
coordinator	of	the	Luxembourg	No	Committee	stated	that	in	formulation	of	their	arguments,	they	were	
inspired	by	their	French	contacts’	 intellectual	work.13	Henri	Wehenkel	of	The	Left	added:	 ‘The	analysis	
came	 from	France.	 ...	We	were	 influenced	by	 the	arguments	of	 the	French	activists’.14	Adrien	Thomas	
from	the	National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	(UNEL)	also	explained	that	the	No	Committee	was	
heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 French	 debate.15	 He	 said:	 ‘We	were	 very	much	 inspired	 by	 the	 French.	We	
were	not	 influenced	by	the	Dutch	because	of	 the	 language’.	Another	No	campaigner,	 the	President	of	
the	Railways	Trade	Union	Nico	Wennmacher,	similarly	noted	that	they	used	the	French	trade	unionists’	
arguments	on	the	subject,	not	that	of	the	Dutch,	as	they	worked	together	in	the	‘Grande	Région’.16			
This	support	 took	a	material	 form	as	well,	 further	deepening	the	diffusion.	Henri	Wehenkel	of	
The	Left	noted:	‘I	went	to	Paris,	to	bring	the	propaganda	that	was	unused	after	the	French	referendum.	I	
brought	3,000	texts	of	the	Constitution	with	the	explanation	and	examples,	from	the	French	Communist	
																																								 																				
11	Interview,	8	April	2008.	
12	Interview,	4	November	2008.	
13	Interview,	12	November	2008.	
14	Interview,	15	April	2008.	
15	Interview,	15	April	2008.	
16	Interview,	10	November	2008.	
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Party’.17	 Adrien	 Thomas	 from	 the	 UNEL	 explained	 that	 some	 ATTAC	 France	 members	 even	 came	 to	
Luxembourg	 to	 help	 distribute	 flyers	 in	mailboxes.18	 Anne-Marie	 Berny	 from	 the	 ATTAC-LUX	 similarly	
stated	 that	 most	 of	 the	 ATTAC-LUX	members	 were	 in	 fact	 French	 living	 in	 Luxembourg.19	While	 she	
mentioned	that	the	ATTAC	France,	Germany	and	Belgium	helped	them,	she	stressed	that	that	they	have	
been	 in	 regular	 contact	 with	 the	 ATTAC	 France	 throughout	 the	 campaign.	 Furthermore,	 the	 ATTAC	
France	has	financially	contributed	to	the	ATTAC	Luxembourg’s	campaign	to	a	small	extent.20	Therefore,	
the	shared	language	between	France	and	Luxembourg	intensified	the	influence	of	the	anti-globalization	
network	between	these	 two	cases.	Luxembourg’s	No	campaign	adopted	French	arguments	 to	a	 larger	
degree	than	the	Spanish	or	Dutch	campaigns.		
Luxembourgish	 Yes	 campaigners	 referred	 to	 this	 influence	openly.	 Pierre	Gramegna,	Director-
General	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce,	 noted:	 ‘They	 had	 an	 anti-Europe	 network	 that	 they	 have	
benefited	 from.	 ...	 They	 had	 all	 the	 anti-Europe	 material,	 they	 were	 pretty	 informed,	 most	 of	 them	
probably	did	not	even	read	the	TCE,	but	they	did	not	need	to	read	it	because	they	got	all	the	prepared	
literature	against	it’.21	Luxembourg	Socialist	Workers'	Party	(LSAP)	MP	Ben	Fayot	added:	‘I	must	say	that	
the	No	campaigners	used	the	French	arguments’.22		CSV	MP	Laurent	Mosar	agreed:	‘The	No	arguments	
in	Luxembourg	were	more	or	less	the	same	as	the	No	arguments	in	France’:23		
B.	Personal	connections		
Among	 the	 states	 holding	 referendums	on	 the	 TCE,	 France	 and	 Luxembourg	 shared	 two	 large	mobile	
communities	that	facilitated	physical	contacts	and	carried	the	campaign	debate	across	the	border:	cross-
border	employees	and	students.		
																																								 																				
17	Interview,	15	April	2008.	
18	Interview,	15	April	2008.	
19	Interview,	17	April	2008.	
20	Interview	with	Pierre	Khalfa	from	ATTAC	France,	22	September	2008.	
21	Interview,	13	November	2008.	
22	Interview,	14	November	2008.	
23	Interview,	14	November	2008.	
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	 The	population	of	Luxembourg	is	just	below	half	a	million.	In	the	1970s,	the	shift	from	an	industrial	
to	a	service-oriented	economy	necessitated	foreign	 labor	–	both	 immigrants	and	cross-border	workers	
(STATEC,	2003).	Today,	over	one-third	of	the	population	is	non-Luxembourger.	2004	census	data	shows	
that	 among	 the	 foreign	 residents	 of	 Luxembourg	 French	 forms	 the	 second	 largest	 group	 after	 the	
Portuguese	 (Scuto,	 2009).	 Furthermore,	 regarding	 cross-border	 employment,	 around	 118,385	 cross-
border	employees	come	into	Luxembourg	on	a	daily	basis	from	France,	Germany	and	Belgium	(EURES,	
2005).	 More	 than	 50%	 of	 these	 cross-border	 employees	 come	 from	 France.	 This	 group	 of	 daily	
commuters	 imported	 campaign	 themes	 from	 abroad.	 Tom	 Graas,	 then	 director	 of	 the	 Luxembourg	
Television	and	Radio	(RTL)	television	news,	explained	that	the	French	commuters	had	a	big	influence	as	
the	discussions	were	carried	everywhere	from	offices	to	restaurants.24		
The	 second	 community	 contributing	 to	 personal	 connections	 is	 the	 mobile	 students.	 The	
University	 of	 Luxembourg	 was	 founded	 only	 in	 2003.	 Frédéric	 Krier	 from	 the	 student	 union	 UNEL	
explained	that	they	had	members	who	studied	in	the	neighboring	countries	and	that	specifically,	during	
the	2005	campaign,	those	in	France	were	very	important	 in	organizing	the	Luxembourgish	campaign.25	
Adrien	Thomas	from	the	UNEL,	who	was	a	doctoral	student	at	Sorbonne	at	the	time,	took	part	in	both	
campaigns	and	stated	that	most	students	came	back	to	Luxembourg	before	the	July	referendum,	after	
their	 classes	 were	 over.26	 Most	 Luxembourgish	 students	 who	 were	 actively	 involved	 in	 the	 French	
campaign	were	also	involved	in	the	Luxembourgish	campaign.	Thomas	explained	that	the	No	Committee	
was	inspired	by	the	French	also	through	the	ATTAC	Campus	network:		
The	UNEL	had	 its	main	base	 in	 Paris	 in	 2005.	…	We	attended	 the	ATTAC	Campus	meetings,	
where	 the	 Constitution	 was	 discussed.	We	 took	 notes.	 Building	 on	 those	 notes	 and	 on	 the	
articles	 we	 read	 in	 the	 left-leaning	 newspapers,	 we	 wrote	 articles	 in	 Luxembourg.	 These	
																																								 																				
24	Interview,	17	November	2008.	
25	Interview,	17	November	2008.	
26	Interview,	15	April	2008.	
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articles	show	clearly	that	we	were	very	close	to	the	French	left’s	critique	of	the	treaty.	We	did	
not	take	the	Constitution	and	interpret	it	for	ourselves.	We	were	inspired.	
This	mobile,	French-speaking	student	community	thus	deepened	these	connections,	contributing	to	the	
adoption	of	campaign	arguments.		
	
Shared	Language/Culture			
Cultural	and	linguistic	similarities	primarily	help	campaigners	in	inviting	each	other	to	participate	in	their	
campaigns.	These	invitations	not	only	reinforce	the	physical	contacts	and	dialogue	on	campaign	themes	
among	 the	 campaigners	 but	 also	 bring	 in	 campaign	 arguments	 from	 the	 other	 cases.	 Participating	 in	
another	campaign	goes	beyond	networking	among	the	campaigners	since	it	also	means	communicating	
with	voters.	Among	the	2005	referendums,	France	and	Luxembourg	are	closely	 linked	 linguistically,	as	
surveys	show	French	as	the	best	known	language	in	Luxembourg	(Stell,	2006).	For	the	other	cases,	the	
lack	of	a	common	language	became	a	barrier	for	further	diffusion.	
My	 Spanish	 interviewees	 mentioned	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 common	 language	 as	 a	 problem	 blocking	
further	cooperation.	 José	Manuel	Fernández	Fernández	of	 the	 IU	explained	 that	 from	the	other	 three	
countries,	 they	 only	 invited	 a	 few	 campaigners	 who	 spoke	 Spanish	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 Spanish	
campaign.27	 Similarly	Carlos	Girbau	Costa,	 from	 the	 Social	 Forum	and	 the	 IU,	 pointed	 to	 the	different	
cultures	of	north	and	south	Europe	and	mentioned	that	the	Netherlands	and	Luxembourg	were	far	from	
Spain,	 while	 France	 shared	 both	 cultures.28	 Jaime	 Pastor,	 member	 of	 the	 IU	 and	 the	 ATTAC	 also	
mentioned	closer	ties	to	France	and	said:	‘We	did	not	meet	with	Dutch.	France	was	more	important	for	
us,	because	we	were	familiar	with	their	debate’.29		
																																								 																				
27	Interview,	7	October	2008.	
28	Interview,	8	October	2008.	
29	Interview,	8	October	2008.		
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Similarly,	 my	 Dutch	 interviewees	 were	 aware	 that	 the	 Luxembourgish	 campaigners	 and	 the	
public	followed	the	French	debate	more	than	the	Dutch	debate.	Willem	Bos,	President	of	the	left-wing	
civil	 society	 group	ConstitutionNo,	 said:	 ‘The	 French	 campaign	 affected	 Luxembourg,	 not	 the	Dutch.	 I	
was	 invited	 to	 Luxembourg	 by	 The	 Left	 during	 their	 campaign.	 They	 invited	 mainly	 French	 speaking	
politicians	 from	 France	 though’.30	 Member	 of	 the	 ConstitutionNo	 Erik	 Wesselius,	 who	 visited	
Luxembourg	during	their	campaign,	also	confirmed	this	pattern:	‘I	did	not	go	to	France.	...	My	French	is	
not	 that	 good.	 ...	 In	 Luxembourg	 there	 were	 people	 from	 France	 going	 and	 leafleting	 at	 doors.	 It	 is	
easier,	they	share	the	language.	It	would	make	no	sense	to	get	a	Frenchmen	here	to	campaign,	there	is	
too	 much	 cultural	 difference.’.31	 International	 Secretary	 of	 the	 PvdA	 Marije	 Laffeber	 added:	 ‘The	
relationship	between	the	Netherlands	and	France	 is	okay	 ...	but	we	are	not	having	 the	same	debates.	
France	has	more	of	a	Latin	culture,	we	have	been	Protestant	for	centuries,	and	they	have	been	Catholic.	
There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 these	 cultures	 in	 Europe.	 Our	 orientation	 is	 more	 towards	 the	 UK	 or	
Scandinavia’.32	Michiel	van	Hulten,	director	of	the	civil	society	Yes	campaign,	the	Foundation	for	a	Better	
Europe,	also	mentioned	that	they	had	relatively	more	connection	with	the	UK.33	He	added:	 ‘In	the	EU,	
they	usually	discuss	with	us,	it	is	also	the	language	which	makes	it	easier’.		
In	 France,	 indeed,	 the	 interviewees	 highlighted	 this	 factor	 as	 a	 facilitator	 of	 cooperation	with	
Luxembourg.	Pierre	Khalfa	from	the	ATTAC	explained	that	they	had	invited	people	from	other	countries	
only	 if	 they	 spoke	 French.34	 Similarly	 Yves	 Salesse,	 the	 co-President	 of	 the	 Copernic	 Foundation,	
mentioned	 that	 he	 was	 invited	 to	 Luxembourg	 but	 not	 to	 the	 Netherlands	 due	 to	 the	 language	
problem.35		
																																								 																				
30	Interview,	8	April	2008.	
31	Interview,	4	November	2008.	
32	Interview,	22	October	2008.	
33	Interview,	30	January	2009.	
34	Interview,	22	September	2008.	
35	Interview,	17	September	2008.	
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In	 turn,	 both	 the	 Yes	 and	 No	 campaigners	 in	 Luxembourg	 stated	 their	 preference	 to	 invite	
French	speakers.	The	Yes	campaigners	invited	the	former	French	Prime	Minister	Michel	Rocard	and	the	
Franco-German	Greens	MEP	Daniel	Cohn-Bendit.	The	 left-wing	No	campaigners	similarly	 invited	highly	
influential	French	politicians	such	as	Henri	Emmanuelli,	José	Bové,	Yves	Salesse,	Raoul-Marc	Jennar,	and	
Francine	Bavay.	Henri	Wehenkel	of	The	Left	said:	‘The	Netherlands	is	far,	we	don’t	know	what	happens	
there.	 We	 only	 look	 at	 France	 and	 Germany....	 The	 No	 Committee	 brought	 many	 famous	 French	
speakers.	...	May	be	from	the	Netherlands	too	but	there	is	the	problem	of	language.	French	politicians	
are	well	known	here’.36		In	fact,	the	LSAP	protested	the	invitation	of	these	French	No	campaigners.	Party	
Chairman	Alex	Bodry	stated	that	it	was	‘inadmissible	for	a	leader	from	the	French	Socialist	Party	to	come	
to	 Luxembourg	 to	 defend	 a	 position	 that	 was	 contrary	 to	 that	 democratically	 adopted	 by	 the	
Luxembourg	Socialists’.37	 The	 invited	campaigners	were	 therefore	highly	 visible	 in	 the	 campaign,	both	
helping	Luxembourgish	campaigners	in	shaping	their	debate	and	interacting	directly	with	voters.		
	
Common	Media	Channels	
This	channel	contributes	to	transfer	of	campaign	themes	across	borders,	thereby	leading	to	an	increased	
presence	 of	 campaign	 arguments	 from	 the	 other	 states.	 Once	 again,	 these	 transfers	 go	 beyond	 the	
campaigners	and	reach	voters	as	well.	Among	the	2005	TCE	referendums,	only	Luxembourg	and	France	
shared	media	channels.	 Luxembourgers	 receive	French	 television	channels	and	newspapers	on	a	daily	
basis.	 Regarding	 television,	 the	 local	 broadcaster	 RTL	 operates	 six	 channels,	 but	 only	 one	 in	
Lëtzebuergesch	(Stell,	2006).	The	national	television	channel	airs	only	from	6pm	to	8pm,	while	the	rest	
of	 the	 channels	 are	 received	directly	 from	France	 and	Germany.	Tom	Graas,	 then	director	 of	 the	RTL	
television	news,	stressed	that	not	only	the	results	and	aftermath	of	the	French	referendum	but	also	the	
																																								 																				
36	Interview,	15	April	2008.	
37	Quoted	in	(Deloy,	2005).	
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French	 referendum	campaign	 itself	was	 covered	 remarkably	 in	 the	media:	 ‘I	 think	 that	 if	we	had	had	
another	referendum	before	the	French,	we	would	have	seen	a	Yes	of	80%.’38		
Both	the	Yes	and	No	campaigners	 (18	out	of	21)	 in	Luxembourg	mentioned	that	Luxembourgers	
received	most	of	 the	discussion	on	 the	subject	 from	other	countries	because	of	 the	 limited	airtime	of	
the	 RTL.	 Abbes	 Jacoby,	 Secretary	 General	 of	 The	 Greens’	 Parliamentary	 Group,	 said:	 ‘In	 Luxembourg	
people	 get	 informed	 not	 only	 from	 national	 news	 but	 also	 from	 TV	 stations	 of	 France,	 Germany	 and	
Belgium.	 ...	 We	 also	 get	 French	 newspapers.	 ...	 The	 background	 information	 they	 get	 is	 not	 from	
Luxembourg,	but	from	other	places’.39	François	Biltgen,	Chairman	of	the	Christian	Social	People's	Party	
(CSV)	 and	 the	 Minister	 of	 Labor	 and	 Employment,	 similarly	 stated	 that	 the	 referendum	 debate	 in	
Luxembourg	 became	 largely	 run	 by	 foreign	 press	 due	 to	 the	 French	 influence.40	 Thus,	 the	 debate	 in	
Luxembourg	was	 significantly	 exposed	 to	 the	 ‘French	 reading’	 of	 the	 subject.	 CSV	MP	 Laurent	Mosar	
highlighted	 this	 issue	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 particular	 No	 campaign	 theme	 concerning	 the	 liberalization	 of	
public	services:41	
Luxembourgers	are	mostly	employed	in	the	public	services.	That	was	also	an	issue	here,	but	
perhaps	not	like	in	France.	It	was	not	a	major	issue.	…	The	problem	was	that	Luxembourgers	
watched	French	and	German	TV,	especially	French	TV.	Those	arguments	used	in	France	were	
finally	also	used	in	Luxembourg.	The	situations	 in	France	and	Luxembourg	are	different	but	
people	watch	 TV,	 hear	 something	 on	 liberalization	 of	 public	 services	 and	 think	 that	 this	 is	
happening	in	Luxembourg	too.	
The	campaign	debate	was	 therefore	not	 limited	 to	arguments	originating	 from	Luxembourg.	Both	 the	
Yes	and	No	campaigners	in	Luxembourg	also	underlined	the	importance	of	the	French	media	in	relation	
to	the	shared	language.	Jacques-Yves	Henckes,	Alternative	Democratic	Reform	Party	(ADR)	MP,	said	that	
																																								 																				
38	Interview,	17	November	2008.	
39	Interview,	10	April	2008.	
40	Interview,	12	November	2008.	
41	Interview,	14	November	2008.	
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their	No	campaign	benefited	from	the	French	campaign	as	Luxembourgers	followed	the	French	debate,	
adding	 that	 ‘people	did	not	 follow	 the	Dutch	debate	 as	 there	was	no	 language	 connection’.42	 Charles	
Goerens,	 Democratic	 Party	 (DP)	MP,	 also	 explained	 that	 although	 the	Netherlands	was	 their	 first	 ally	
after	WW2,	their	culture	was	closer	to	France	and	that	people	watched	French	television,	finding	Dutch	
less	 understandable.43	 Similarly,	 LSAP	 MP	 Ben	 Fayot	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 French	 No	
campaign	websites,	 which	 Luxembourgers	 followed	 closely.44	While	 such	media	 exposure	might	 be	 a	
common	 problem	 for	 campaigners	 in	 a	 globalizing	 world,	 Luxembourg’s	 peculiar	 media	 set	 up	 has	
magnified	the	impact	of	the	foreign	press,	by	bringing	in	the	French	analysis	of	the	TCE.	Luxembourgish	
citizens	were	directly	exposed	to	French	argumentation.		
	
Implications	for	Referendum	Results	
Diffusion	 matters	 because	 strategic	 arguments	 are	 shown	 to	 affect	 public	 opinion.	 Even	 though	
Luxembourg	approved	the	referendum,	as	opposed	to	the	outcome	in	France,	it	is	important	to	look	at	
the	Luxembourgish	percentages	closely.	The	No	vote	 intentions	went	 from	a	very	 low	 initial	 level	 to	a	
significant	 43%,	 which	 is	 remarkable	 for	 the	 highly	 pro-EU	 Luxembourg.	 A	 TNS-ILRES	 study	 found	
interesting	 evidence	 of	 diffusion.45	 During	 the	 focus	 group	 meetings,	 where	 people	 were	 asked	 to	
elaborate	 on	 their	 reasons	 to	 vote	 positively	 or	 negatively,	 Luxembourgers	 confused	 Luxembourgish	
unemployment	 figures	with	 French	 figures.	 This	 confirms	 that	 Luxembourg’s	 referendum	 debate	was	
heavily	subjected	to	the	French	argumentation	on	the	TCE	due	to	the	diffusion	channels.	Similarly,	the	
																																								 																				
42	Interview,	17	April	2008.	
43	Interview,	10	November	2008.	
44	Interview,	14	November	2008.	
45	Interviews	with	Dr.	Philippe	Poirier	on	17	April	2008,	and	Charles	Margue	–	Director	of	the	TNS-ILRES	–	on	18	
November	2008.	
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geographical	 distribution	 of	 the	 negative	 vote	 supports	 the	 argument.	 Of	 the	 nine	 communes	 of	
Luxembourg	that	voted	against	the	TCE,	seven	of	them	are	located	right	at	the	border	with	France.46			
Yet,	 understanding	 whether	 borrowed	 arguments	 influenced	 referendum	 results	 requires	
further	 research.	 While	 borrowing	 from	 the	 previous	 successful	 campaigns	 is	 an	 advantage	 for	 the	
campaigners	in	second-mover	states,	both	the	modular	action	and	policy	transfer	literatures	warn	that	
these	arguments	should	be	adapted	to	the	national	framework	to	increase	their	potential	(Dolowitz	et	
al.,	1996;	Newmark,	2002;	Snow	et	al.,	1999;	Soule,	2003).	In	this	research,	although	the	ATTAC	France	
was	seen	as	a	reference	point	through	their	early	analysis	of	the	TCE	among	the	three	adopter	countries,	
it	was	only	the	Dutch	campaigners	who	paid	significant	attention	to	local	tailoring	of	these	arguments.	
The	 far	 left	 SP	 strategically	 linked	 these	 anti-globalization	 arguments	 to	 the	 loss	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 a	
European	‘super-state’.	The	SP	Secretary-General	Hans	van	Heijningen	explained	that	far	left	messages	
would	not	carry	them	to	51%	in	the	Netherlands	and	strongly	emphasized	the	work	that	had	to	be	done	
nationally.47		
Direction	of	diffusion	is	another	question	that	requires	attention.	In	this	research,	chronological	
order	 appears	 to	 be	 the	main	 factor	 designating	 French	 campaign	 as	 the	 source	 because	 the	 French	
campaigners	were	the	ones	that	prepared	the	first	analysis	of	the	TCE.	In	the	modular	action	literature,	
McAdam	 (1995)	 distinguishes	between	 initiator	movements,	which	 set	 a	 protest	 cycle	 in	motion,	 and	
spin	 off	 movements,	 which	 are	 sparked	 by	 the	 initiators.	 Similarly,	 the	 policy	 transfer	 literature	
highlights	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 United	 States	 in	 the	 transfer	 of	 election	 strategies	 due	 to	 its	 global	
ideological	hegemony	(Dolowitz	et	al.,	1999;	Needham,	2010).	An	important	question	is	whether	there	is	
an	element	of	size	as	well	(e.g.	Linos,	2011;	Ramos	et	al.,	2007).	Would	Luxembourg	be	able	to	serve	as	
the	 source	 campaign?	 This	 has	 crucial	 policy	 implications.	 In	 2005,	 the	 fact	 that	 Spain	 held	 the	 first	
																																								 																				
46	(Hausemer,	2005).	Socioeconomic	status	could	however	be	an	alternative	explanation	for	this	concentration.	
47	Interview,	11	April	2008.	
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referendum	was	not	a	coincidence	(Torreblanca,	2005).48	Spain’s	strong	pro-EU	attitude	was	envisioned	
to	build	a	positive	momentum	yet	this	was	not	achieved.	
	
Conclusion	
	In	 contrast	with	 the	 assumption	 in	most	 social	 scientific	 analyses,	 cases	 are	 not	 always	 independent	
from	each	 other.	However,	 diffusion	 depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 channels.	 The	 degree	 to	which	 the	
campaigners	are	in	contact,	discuss	campaign	themes,	and	borrow	from	one	another	depends	on	these	
channels.	 Collaborative	 networks	 exist	 all	 around	 in	 Europe	 and	 facilitate	 ‘shallow’	 diffusion	 between	
campaigners	 by	 providing	 platforms	 to	meet	 and	 share	 campaign-related	 information.	Nonetheless,	 a	
‘deeper’	 version	of	diffusion,	which	 imports	 arguments	 from	other	 campaigns,	 is	 visible	among	 states	
that	speak	the	same	language	and	share	media	channels,	 involving	not	only	campaigners	but	voters	as	
well.		
Can	the	findings	of	this	research	be	generalized?	The	literature	highlights	the	exceptionality	of	
the	2005	referendums.	Closa	(2007)	argues	that	the	European	arena	created	a	norm	in	favor	of	holding	
referendums	during	 that	period.	Wimmel	 (2013)	 stresses	 that	 the	TCE	 referendums	were	 the	 first	 EU	
referendums	to	be	held	in	Spain,	the	Netherlands,	and	Luxembourg.	While	these	are	indeed	exceptional	
circumstances,	this	does	not	mean	that	diffusion	is	limited	to	the	four	cases.	Europe	is	full	of	states	that	
share	similar	cultures,	media	sources,	institutional	and	personal	connections.	In	a	globalizing	world,	we	
are	bound	to	see	more	and	more	interactions	among	these	states.	Had	Germany	or	Belgium	held	their	
referendums	before	 Luxembourg,	 these	 states	would	probably	have	had	a	 similar	 impact	as	 they	also	
share	 peculiar	 diffusion	 channels	 with	 Luxembourg.	 Focus	 group	 data	 showed	 that	 Luxembourgers	
complain	 about	 the	 doubling	 of	 prices	 after	 the	 Euro	 in	 the	 exact	 same	 way	 as	 Germans	 discuss	 it;	
referring	to	‘Teuro’,	a	German	term	combining	‘teuer’	–	expensive	–	with	‘euro’	(Dumont	et	al.,	2007).	
																																								 																				
48	Interview	with	José	Ignacio	Torreblanca,	6	October	2008.		
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As	discussed,	Jahn	and	Storsved	(1995)	point	to	the	importance	of	sequencing	among	Austria,	Finland,	
Sweden,	and	Norway	 in	 their	accession	referendums.	Similarly,	 in	 the	 first	 Irish	 referendum	on	Lisbon	
treaty	in	2008,	Holmes	(2008)	highlights	the	UK’s	influence	on	Ireland	via	common	media	channels.	The	
UK	 Independence	 Party	 has	 even	 visited	 Ireland	 on	 several	 occasions	 during	 the	 Lisbon	 campaigns,	
participating	actively	in	the	Irish	debate	and	distributing	leaflets	advising	a	No	vote.	My	interview	data	
also	 shows	 some	 collaboration	 among	 the	Dutch,	 French	 and	 Irish	No	 campaigners	 via	 the	 EP	 groups	
during	 the	 same	 period.49	 Diffusion	 effects	 can	 be	 observed	 across	 Europe,	 thus	 analyzing	 cross-case	
influences	 is	absolutely	vital	 to	understanding	 referendum	campaigns,	and	 indirectly	 to	understanding	
the	referendum	outcomes.	
	
List	of	Interviewed	Organizations	
Spain:	
• Spanish	Socialist	Workers’	Party	
• Popular	Party	
• Convergence	and	Unity		
• Basque	Nationalist	Party		
• United	Left	
• Republican	Left	of	Catalonia	
• Initiative	for	Catalonia	Greens	
• Basque	Solidarity	
• ATTAC	
• Social	Forum	
• Ecologists	in	Action	
France:	
• Union	for	a	Popular	Movement	
• Union	for	French	Democracy	
• Socialist	Party	
• The	Greens	
• National	Front	
• French	Communist	Party	
• Revolutionary	Communist	League	
• ATTAC,	
• Copernic	Foundation	
																																								 																				
49	 Interviews	with	Harry	Van	Bommel,	8	April	 2008	and	31	October	2008;	Christophe	Beaudouin,	 15	 September	
2008;	Daniel	Cirera,	10	September	2008;	Francine	Bavay,	22	September	2008.	
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• Notre	Europe	
• The	Gaullist	‘Group	for	a	Confederation	of	the	States	of	Europe	to	Say	No’	
The	Netherlands:	
• Christian	Democratic	Appeal		
• People's	Party	for	Freedom	and	Democracy		
• Democrats	66		
• Dutch	Labor	Party		
• GreenLeft		
• Socialist	Party		
• Christian	Union		
• ATTAC	
• ‘ConstitutionNo’	
• Pim	Fortuyn	List	and	Young	Fortuynists	
• Livable	Rotterdam	
Luxembourg:	
• Christian	Social	People's	Party		
• Democratic	Party		
• Luxembourg	Socialist	Workers'	Party		
• The	Greens	
• Alternative	Democratic	Reform	Party	
• The	Left	
• ATTAC	
• No	Committee	
• National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	
• Social	Forum	
European	No	Campaign	
	
	
Interview	Questionnaire	
• What	were	the	main	issues/arguments	raised	in	your	campaign	for/against	the	Treaty	establishing	a	
Constitution	for	Europe?	
• Why	did	you	specifically	choose	these	issues?	
• Did	your	party/organization	have	a	campaigning	strategy?	
• Was	your	campaign	affected	by	the	referendum	campaigns	in	other	countries?		
• If	so,	which	countries	were	they?	Why?	How	was	your	campaign	affected?	
• Did	you	meet	with	any	campaigners	from	other	countries?		
• If	so,	which	networks	facilitated	such	meetings?	Were	these	meetings	regular?		
• Did	you	have	any	contacts	with	 the	campaigning	groups	 in	other	 countries	 through	 transnational	
party	groups	or	NGOs?		
• Did	you	use	the	issues/arguments	raised	in	other	countries’	campaigns?	
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States	that	were	
connected	via	this	
channel	
Number	of	interviewees		
who	mentioned	the	
importance	of	this	channel	
Shared	language/culture	
	
France-Luxembourg	 59	out	of	85	
Common	media	channels	
	
France-Luxembourg	 28	out	of	85	
Collaborative	networks	
	
EP	groups	 All	four	states	 73	out	of	85	
	
	
Anti-globalization	network		 All	four	states	
Ad	hoc	European	networks	 All	four	states	
Mobile	communities	 France-Luxembourg	
Table	1:	Diffusion	channels		
	
	
	
	
	
